

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 01134 01 OF 05 031829Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EURE-00 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

ACDA-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-10 SAM-01 NIC-01 ERDA-05

/079 W

----- 128796

P R 031550Z MAR 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 396

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVAVEUR

CINCUSAFE

ALL NATO CAPITALS 5073

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 USNATO 1134

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

REF: A. USNATO 0575

B. USNATO 0701

C. USNATO 0901

D. USNATO 0950

E. USNATO 1058

F. USNATO 1092

G. STATE 035746 (NOTAL)

INTERNATIONAL STAFF (IS) HAS CIRCULATED REVISED DRAFT MINISTERIAL
GUIDACNE DOCUMENT (DRC/WP(75)1 (REVISED) WITH COVER NOTE BY ASYG
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 01134 01 OF 05 031829Z

HUMPHREYS. MISSION COMMENT: IN OUR VIEW, WHILE ASYG HUMPHREYS HAS,
AS USUAL, TAKEN SOME LIBERTIES WITH DRC DECISIONS MADE DURING
RECENT DRAFTING SESSIONS (REFS C, D, E, AND F), NEW IS DRAFT
GENERALLY SQUARES WITH US OBJECTIVES, EXCEPT FOR SECTION ON

"WARNING OF WAR". DURING FUTURE DRC MEETINGS, MISSION WILL PURSUE OBJECTIVES OUTLINED IN REFS B AND G WHICH INCLUDE NEW LANGUAGE FOR SECTION ON "WARNING OF WAR" AND RELATED LANGUAGE IN "PRIORITIES" SECTION, CLEAR-CUT DIRECTIVES FOR IMPLEMENTING/MONITORING COOPERATIVE AND COMMON PROGRAMS (LATEST IS DRAFT IS PARTICULARLY WEAK ON STANDARDIZATION), AND CONCISE SECTION ON "LONG RANGE DEFENSE CONCEPT". END COMMENT. TEXT OF ASYG HUMPHREY'S COVER NOTE FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT OF COVER NOTE:

DEFENCE REVIEW COMMITTEE
MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE - 1975
NOTE BY THE CHAIRMAN

IN THE LIGHT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS THIS WEEK, I ATTACH A REVISED DRAFT OF THE MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE DOCUMENT.

2. PARAGRAPHS 22 TO 25 ON WARNING TIME, WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET DISCUSSED, ARE REPRODUCED FROM THE EARLIER DRAFT IN SQUARE BRACKETS. THE MATERIAL MISSING FROM PARAGRAPHS 3 TO 8 AND 35 WILL BE CIRCULATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. THE REVISED DRAFT WILL BE DISCUSSED AT OUR NEXT MEETING ON TUESDAY, 11TH MARCH.

END TEXT OF COVER NOTE. TEXT OF DRC/WP(75)1 (REVISED) FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT:

MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE 1975

INTRODUCTION

THE AGREED PROCEDURES FOR DEFENCE PLANNING IN NATO(1) CALL FOR MINISTERS TO GIVE GUIDANCE EVERY TWO YEARS FOR THE FORCE PROPOSALS TO BE PREPARED BY THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS AND FOR THE SUBSEQUENT STEPS LEADING TO THE ADOPTION OF FORCE GOALS. THE GUIDANCE IS INTENDED TO REFLECT THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 01134 01 OF 05 031829Z

TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY FACTORS WHICH COULD AFFECT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO FORCES DURING THE NEXT PLANNING PERIOD, AND THE IMPACT OF THESE FACTORS UNDER NATO STRATEGY. WHERE APPROPRIATE IT WILL ALSO IDENTIFY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS, ESTABLISH PRIORITIES, AND DRAW ATTENTION TO AREAS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO ALLIANCE DEFENCE.

2. THE GUIDANCE, BEING A MAJOR POLICY DOCUMENT ENDORSED BY MINISTERS, ALSO PROVIDES A REFERENCE POINT AND DIRECTIVE FOR ALL DEFENSE PLANNING ACTIVITIES AND SUPPORTING PROGRAMMES, BOTH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IN NATO. ITS CONTENTS SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING GUIDANCE.

LONG-RANGE DEFENCE CONCEPT

BRACKET PARAGRAPHS 3-8 - TO FOLLOW BRACKET

(1) DPC/D(71)10, 31ST AUGUST, 1971

SOVIET POLICY AND THE WARSAW PACT

9. THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF TENSION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAVE STILL TO BE RESOLVED. IN ADDITION TO ITS IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS THE SOVIET UNION HAS EMBARKED UPON A CONTEST FOR POWER IN WHICH POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ISSUES ARE INVOLVED. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SOVIET LEADERS HAVE RENOUNCED THEIR ULTIMATE AIM OF EXTENDING SOVIET COMMUNIST POWER AND INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THEY WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES, INCLUDING THOSE OFFERED BY SUBVERSION, TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION AND THREATEN WESTERN INTERESTS WHEREVER THEY CAN DO SO WITHOUT UNDUE MILITARY RISK. THESE POLICIES WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE USE, DIRECT AND INDIRECT, OF THEIR MILITARY POWER, WHICH CONTINUES TO BE BUILT UP WITHOUT LOSS OF MOMENTUM ON A WORLDWIDE SCALE.

10. AT THE SAME TIME THE SOVIETS WILL BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WEST ON CERTAIN BROAD ISSUES OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY, BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS (SALT) AND THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS. DESPITE SOME IMPROVEMENT IN POLITICAL RELATIONS RESULTING FROM
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NATO 01134 01 OF 05 031829Z

THESE NEGOTIATIONS, ANY BENEFITS IN TERMS OF MILITARY SECURITY STILL REMAIN TO BE IDENTIFIED AND CANNOT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THIS GUIDANCE.

11. IN RELATION TO THE WESTERN WORLD THE OBJECTIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION REMAIN THE SAME. SHE REMAINS DETERMINED TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE WARSAW PACT, AND TO MAINTAIN HER PREDOMINANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE. HER AIMS ALSO INCLUDE WEAKENING THE POLITICAL COHESION OF THE WEST, PROVOKING DIVISIONS BETWEEN ITS MEMBERS, ESPECIALLY BETWEEN THE NORTH AMERICAN ALLIES AND EUROPE, AND WORKING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OR REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES FORCES FROM EUROPE.

AS REGARDS THE USE OF MILITARY POWER SHE HAS IN RECENT YEARS PURSUED A CAUTIONS LINE, RECOGNIZING THAT ANY PRIZES, STRATEGIC, ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL WHICH SHE MIGHT GAIN THEREBY CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED AT A COST WHICH MAY RENDER THEM VALUELESS. IT IS CLEAR FROM HER ACTIONS, HOWEVER, THAT SHE HAS NOT RENOUNCED THE USE OF FORCE TO ATTAIN HER ENDS WHERE SHE BELIEVES THEY CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT UNDUE RISK.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 01134 02 OF 05 031903Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EURE-00 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

ACDA-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-10 SAM-01 NIC-01 ERDA-05

/079 W

----- 129260

P R 031755Z MAR 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 397

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVAVEUR

CINCUSAFE

ALL NATO CAPITALS 5074

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 5 USNATO 1134

12. IN AREAS ADJACENT TO NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, SOVIET POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR MILITARY PENETRATION IS ALREADY EVIDENT AND UNDERMINES WESTERN INTERESTS AND SECURITY. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ON WHOSE OIL RESOURCES THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY THE NATO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT. SOVIET INDIRECT INTERVENTION IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR IS A TYPICAL ILLUSTRATION OF HER STRATEGIC INTEREST IN THIS THEATRE. SOVIET MARITIME ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, LENDS POWER AND CONVICTION TO SUPPORT HER POLICIES IN THESE AREAS. FURTHER AFIELD, THE INCREASING GLOBAL DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET MARITIME FORCES STRENGTHENS SOVIET EFFORTS TO LIMIT OR REPLACE WESTERN INFLUENCE WHEREVER POSSIBLE, AND TO SUPPORT REGIMES SYMPATHETIC TO THE SOVIET UNION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 01134 02 OF 05 031903Z

THE THREAT

13. THE WARSAW PACT ALREADY POSSESSES A MILITARY CAPABILITY MUCH GREATER THAN THAT NEEDED FOR SELF-DEFENCE. THE THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FIELD THE SOVIET UNION, HAVING ALREADY ATTAINED ROUGH

PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES, NOW APPEARS TO BE SEEKING TO ATTAIN A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE THROUGH THE COMBINATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY WITH SUPERIOR THROW-WEIGHT. IMPROVEMENTS ARE BEING MADE IN THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL LAND AND AIR FORCES; THE INCREASE IN THE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY OF THESE FORCES, REPRESENTED BY NEW TANKS, ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT. AT SEA THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET MARITIME FORCES AND THEIR WORLD-WIDE DEPLOYMENT HAVE ADDED A NEW DIMENSION TO THE THREAT.

14. HOWEVER, THE MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY IS CLOSELY RELATED TO NATO'S WILL AND CAPABILITY TO REACT, AND TO THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THIS. SHOULD WEAKNESSES IN OUR POLITICAL RESOLVE, OR INADEQUACIES IN THE SCALE OF EFFORT WE DEVOTE TO OUR OWN DEFENCE CAUSE THE WARSAW PACT TO DOUBT THE ULTIMATE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE, OUR GENERAL CAPABILITY TO RESIST AGGRESSION OR OUR DETERMINATION TO DEFEND OURSELVES BY ALL MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL, THEY MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO USE THE MILITARY POWER AVAILABLE TO THEM IN A DELIBERATE ATTACK ON NATO.

15. THE COMMON DEFENSE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE IS ONE AND INDIVISIBLE. NATO WOULD CONSIDER AN ATTACK ON ONE OR MORE OF THEM AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL. HOWEVER, THERE COULD BE DIFFERENCES FROM REGION TO REGION IN THE WAY THE WARSAW PACT WOULD ASSESS THE RISKS AND ADVANTAGES OF SUCH AN ATTACK AND IN THE SCALE OF ATTACK TO BE ADOPTED; IT COULD VARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH GEOGRAPHY AND THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN EACH AREA.

16. THE POSSIBILITY OF GENERAL NUCLEAR ATTACK REMAINS, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY SO LONG AS THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIANCE RETAIN A CREDIBLE SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY. AS FOR NATO EUROPE AS A WHOLE, THE WARSAW PACT MUST REALIZE THAT A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK (WITH OR WITHOUT THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 01134 02 OF 05 031903Z

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS) WOULD CARRY WITH IT AN EXTREMELY HIGH RISK OF INVOLVING VERY SUBSTANTIAL NATO FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. AN ATTACK ON A LIMITED SCALE SEEMS UNLIKELY IN THE CENTRAL REGION OF ACE WHERE THERE IS A MAJOR CONCENTRATION OF NATO COMBAT FORCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WARSAW PACT MIGHT JUDGE THAT THE MILITARY WEAKNESSES OF THE FLANKS WOULD MAKE THEM PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO A DELIBERATE ATTACK ON A LIMITED SCALE. AT SEA THE GROWTH OF THEIR NAVY NOW GIVES THE SOVIET UNION THE ABILITY TO ATTACK NATO FORCES AND TO INTERFERE WITH NATO SUPPLY ROUTES AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF INTENSITY, INDEPENDENTLY OF A LAND/AIR ATTACK ON NATO TERRITORY.

NATO STRATEGY

17. THE AIM OF NATO'S STRATEGY AND MILITARY PLANNING IS TO ENSURE SECURITY THROUGH DETERRENCE. THE PRIMARY AIM IS TO DETER AN ATTACK BEFORE IT IS LAUNCHED, BY MAKING IT CLEAR TO ANY AGGRESSOR THAT ANY ATTACK ON NATO WOULD INITIATE A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH CANNOT BE CALCULATED IN ADVANCE, AND WHICH INVOLVES RISKS TO THE AGGRESSOR OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO ANY ADVANTAGES HE MIGHT HOPE TO GAIN. IN AN ERA OF BROAD STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARITY DETERRENCE TO ALL FORMS OF AGGRESSION CANNOT CREDIBLY BE BASED UPON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ALONE; IT MUST BE PROVIDED BY THE OVERALL CAPABILITIES OF NATO FORCES. THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT NEED NOR INTEND TO MATCH WARSAW PACT FORCE CAPABILITIES IN EVERY RESPECT, BUT MUST BE ABLE TO RESPOND IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER TO AGGRESSION OF ANY KIND. THE RESPONSE MUST BE EFFECTIVE IN RELATION TO THE LEVEL OF FORCE USED BY THE AGGRESSOR AND MUST ALSO CARRY WITH IT THE THREAT OF ESCALATION TO A HIGHER LEVEL.

18. SHOULD AGGRESSION OCCUR, THE MILITARY AIM IS TO PRESERVE OR RESTORE THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATO AREA BY EMPLOYING SUCH FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF FORWARD DEFENCE. NATO FORCES MUST BE PREPARED TO USE ANY CAPABILITIES AT THEIR DISPOSAL (INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS) FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN VARIOUS COURSES OF ACTION, E.G. TO OPPOSE A DIRECT DEFENCE, TO ESCALATE THE CONFLICT DELIBERATELY IN ORDER TO BRING HOME TO THE OTHER SIDE WITH UNMISTAKABLE FORCE THE RISKS OF CONTINUED AGGRESSION, OR A CONTINUATION OF BOTH. THE OPTION OF A GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE SHOULD ALSO BE AVAILABLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NATO 01134 02 OF 05 031903Z

PURPOSE OF NATO FORCES

19. IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THIS STRATEGY NATO NEEDS:

(A) CONVENTIONAL LAND, SEA AND AIR FORCES CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING THE INITIAL SHOCK OF ATTACK AND THEREAFTER OF CONDUCTING A COHERENT AND EFFECTIVE DEFENSE IN THE FORWARD AREAS FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE;

(B) A CAPABILITY FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES: THIS CAPABILITY SHOULD BE OF SUCH SIZE, BALANCE AND CHARACTER, AND SO DEPLOYED AND ORGANIZED, AS TO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF NATO WITH THE AIM OF:

(I) CONVINCING THE AGGRESSOR THAT ANY ATTACK ON NATO, WHETHER CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR, COULD RESULT IN SERIOUS DAMAGE TO HIS FORCES;

(II) PRESENTING HIM WITH THE RISK THAT SUCH A SITUATION COULD ESCALATE BEYOND HIS CONTROL IN THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION, WHILE RETAINING CONTROL OF THIS PROCESS AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN NATO HANDS;

(C) STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, MANIFESTLY CAPABLE OF
INFLECTING UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE ON THE SOVIET UNION EVEN
AFTER SURPRISE NUCLEAR ATTACK.

20. THESE ELEMENTS OF NATO FORCES SHOULD EACH POSSESS A
CREDIBILITY OF THEIR OWN, AND SHOULD COMBINE TO PRODUCE AN
INTERLOCKING SYSTEM OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE. SPECIFICALLY:

(A) THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH TO
RESIST AND REPEL A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK ON A LIMITED
SCALE, AND TO DETER LARGER SCALE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS
THROUGH THE PROSPECT OF AN EXPANSION OF THE AREA,
SCALE AND INTENSITY OF HOSTILITIES WHICH COULD INVOLVE
THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NEVERTHELESS, SHOULD
LARGE-SCALE CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION(1) OCCUR, THE
CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING
A DEFENCE IN THE FORWARD AREAS SUFFICIENT TO INFLICT
SERIOUS LOSSES ON THE AGGRESSOR AND CONVINCE HIM OF
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 NATO 01134 02 OF 05 031903Z

THE RISKS OF SUCH ESCALATION;

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 01134 03 OF 05 031921Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EURE-00 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

ACDA-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-10 SAM-01 NIC-01 ERDA-05

/079 W

----- 129489

P R 031550Z MAR 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 398

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVAVEUR

CINCUSAFE

ALL NATO CAPITALS 5075

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 5 USNATO 1134

(B) THE PURPOSE OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IS TO ENHANCE THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES AGAINST LARGE-SCALE CONVENTIONAL ATTACK OR AGAINST THE EXPANSION OF LIMITED ATTACKS, AND TO EMPHASIZE THE DANGERS OF A CONTINUANCE OF A CONFLICT ONCE BEGUN BY POSING THE RISKS OF ESCALATION OVER WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE NO CONTROL, UP TO ALL-OUT NUCLEAR WAR;

(C) IT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TO PROVIDE THIS ULTIMATE SANCTION FOR THE OVERALL STRATEGY.

21. THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS DISCUSS SOME OF THE FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE THE CHARACTERISTICS REQUIRED OF NATO FORCES AND
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 01134 03 OF 05 031921Z

THEIR SUPPORT IN DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE.

WARNING OF WAR

22. WARNING OF WAR IS A CONTINUING PROCESS OF ASSESSING FROM AVAILABLE POLITICAL AND MILITARY INDICATORS THE LIKELIHOOD OF A WARSAW PACT DECISION TO ATTACK AND OF THEIR PREPAREDNESS TO DO SO. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES WILL BE ABLE TO DETERMINE POSITIVELY THAT A DECISION TO ATTACK HAS BEEN TAKEN OR WHEN SUCH AN ATTACK WILL TAKE PLACE. DECISIONS ABOUT INCREASING NATO'S PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO BE TAKEN ON INCOMPLETE EVIDENCE, WHEN THE VARIOUS INDICATORS AVAILABLE COMBINE TO JUSTIFY THE TAKING OF A CERTAIN LEVEL OF COUNTERMEASURES. THIS PROCESS CAN ONLY BE A MATTER OF JUDGEMENT FOR THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES AT THE TIME; IT CANNOT BE FORECAST. BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO DEFENCE PLANNING TWO PRINCIPLES MUST BE EMPHASIZED:

(1) SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES HAVE AN EXTENSIVE CAPABILITY TO UNDERTAKE CHEMICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

(A) ALL AUTHORITIES, BOTH NATO AND NATIONAL, CONCERNED WITH DECISION-MAKING IN TIME OF CRISIS, MUST RECOGNISE THE ADVANTAGE WHICH THE AGGRESSOR GAINS FROM THE INITIATIVE; THIS ADVANTAGE WILL BE INCREASED IF NATO DECISIONS ARE DELAYED UNTIL UNDENIABLE EVIDENCE OF IMPENDING ATTACK IS PROVIDED. THE EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF NATO'S DEFENCE WILL DEPEND UPON EARLY AND RESOLUTE USE OF SUCH WARNING AS MAY BE AVAILABLE;

(B) SOME BROAD BUT REALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE TIME WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE FOR NATO COUNTRIES TO PUT THEIR

FORCES AND ECONOMIES ON A FULL WAR FOOTING
(I.E. "USABLE WARNING TIME" OR "PREPARATION TIME")
ARE ESSENTIAL FOR RATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING.

23. THE EXTENT OF THE WARNING WHICH NATO MIGHT EXPECT TO
RECEIVE IN VARIOUS CASES IS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL IN THE CURRENT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 01134 03 OF 05 031921Z

AGREED INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION(1). THIS STATES THAT IN PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES SURPRISE ATTACK WITH NUCLEAR MISSILES IS CONSIDERED
AS HIGHLY UNLIKELY. AS FOR OTHER FORMS OF ATTACK, IT IS BELIEVED
THAT SOVIET CALCULATIONS WOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE DESIRE TO
ACHIEVE THE OPTIMUM COMPROMISE BETWEEN ACHIEVING SURPRISE AND
ENSURING FOR THEMSELVES THE FULL ADVANTAGES OF MOBILISATION AND
PREPARATION. IN THE FIRST CASE THE WARSAW PACT MIGHT FOREGO
THE FULL ADVANTAGES OF PREPARATION IN FAVOUR OF SURPRISE. IN
THIS CASE STRONG INDICATORS PROVIDING ABOUT 48 HOURS OF WARNING
MIGHT BE EXPECTED. IN THE SECOND THE WARSAW PACT MIGHT PREFER
TO TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF ITS MOBILISATION AND REINFORCEMENT
CAPABILITY AND TO ATTACK AFTER 21 DAYS OF PREPARATION. NOT ALL
OF THIS PERIOD WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO NATO AS WARNING TIME,
PARTICULARLY IF THE WARSAW PACT DECIDED TO POSTPONE MAJOR FORWARD
MOVEMENT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.

(1) WARSAW PACT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES - MC 161/75

24. IT MAY BE CONCLUDED FROM THE ABOVE THAT A REASONABLE
ASSUMPTION FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IS THAT IN CASE OF A MAJOR
ATTACK, NATO MIGHT EXPECT TO RECEIVE BETWEEN 3 AND 14 DAYS OF
WARNING. IN CALCULATING THE USABLE TIME AVAILABLE TO THE MILITARY
AUTHORITIES, HOWEVER, TIME HAS TO BE ALLOWED WITHIN THIS PERIOD
FOR THE EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS BY THE POLITICAL
AUTHORITIES, AND FOR CONSULTATION AND DECISION-MAKING.

25. IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASISED THAT IN PLANNING THEIR
ATTACK AND IN DECIDING ON THE METHOD OF ITS EXECUTION THE SOVIETS
WOULD TAKE INTO THEIR CALCULATIONS THEIR PERCEPTION OF NATO'S
ABILITY TO WITHSTAND AND SURVIVE AN ATTACK WITH LITTLE OR NO
WARNING, COMPARED WITH ITS MOBILISATION AND REINFORCEMENT
CAPABILITY.

NATURE OF ATTACK AND DEFENCE

26. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE PRECISELY THE CHARACTER
OF A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK BY WARSAW PACT FORCES ON WESTERN EUROPE.
NEVERTHELESS, IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE SOME BROAD ASSUMPTIONS
ABOUT THE TACTICS WHICH MIGHT BE ADOPTED BY THE WARSAW PACT IN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NATO 01134 03 OF 05 031921Z

MOUNTING SUCH AN ATTACK, IN ORDER TO PLAN AN EFFECTIVE DEFENCE AND MAXIMISE THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF NATO FORCES AGAINST IT.

27. THE MILITARY DOCTRINES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND THE COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THEIR LAND AND AIR FORCES SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THEIR CONCEPT OF ATTACK ENVISAGES HIGHLY MOBILE CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES, BACKED WITH HEAVY FIRE-POWER, POSSIBLY INCLUDING NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE STAYING POWER OF INDIVIDUAL FORMATIONS MIGHT BE LIMITED, BUT THE MOMENTUM OF THE ASSAULT WOULD BE MAINTAINED BY SUCCESSIVE REPLACEMENT FROM SUBSTANTIAL FOLLOW-UP FORCES. THEIR AIM WOULD BE TO FORCE A QUICK BREAKTHROUGH OF NATO DEFENCES IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT DECISIVE MILITARY RESULTS BEFORE THE MANPOWER AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THE ALLIANCE COULD BE MOBILISED TO STABILISE THE SITUATION.

28. NATO'S AIMS THEREFORE ARE TO SURVIVE AND WITHSTAND THE INITIAL SHOCK OF ATTACK, AND THEREAFTER TO PRESERVE OR RESTORE THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATO AREA BY EMPLOYING SUCH FORCES AS MAY BE NECESSARY WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF FORWARD DEFENCE. NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING A COHERENT CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE SO AS NOT TO FORCE PREMATURE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HOWEVER, THE ALLIANCE MUST BE PREPARED TO USE ANY FORCE CAPABILITIES AT ITS DISPOSAL, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EITHER IN THE CONTEXT OF DIRECT DEFENCE OR DELIBERATE ESCALATION, TO BRING HOME TO THE OTHER SIDE WITH UNMISTAKABLE FORCE THE RISKS OF CONTINUED AGGRESSION AND TO PROMOTE THE EARLY AND FAVOURABLE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES. NATO FORCES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING A COHERENT CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE BOTH UP TO AND AFTER THE POINT AT WHICH A DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS BEEN TAKEN.

29. THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY THAT CONFLICTS IN AREAS BORDERING UPON, BUT NOT WITHIN THE NATO AREA COULD BE EXTENDED IN WAYS WHICH AFFECT THE SECURITY OF NATO NATIONS. INITIALLY, THESE COULD BE OF A MORE LIMITED CHARACTER AND OF A LOWER INTENSITY FROM THOSE ENVISAGED IN THE CENTRAL REGION, BUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF ESCALATION IN BOTH THE INTENSITY AND AREA OF THE CONFLICT SHOULD ALSO BE BORNE IN MIND.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 01134 04 OF 05 031929Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

ACDA-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-10 SAM-01 NIC-01 ERDA-05

/079 W

----- 129584

P R 031550Z MAR 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 399
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVAVEUR
CINCUSAFE
ALL NATO CAPITALS 5076
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 5 USNATO 1134

30. FINALLY, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT, INDEPENDENTLY OF A LAND/AIR ATTACK ON NATO TERRITORY, THE SOVIET UNION MAY CHOOSE TO USE HER GROWING MARITIME CAPABILITIES AGAINST NATO FORCES AT SEA OR IN ORDER TO INTERFERE WITH THE ECONOMIES AND VITAL SUPPLIES OF NATO NATIONS. THE PROCESS OF ESCALATION ARISING FROM SUCH A SITUATION IS NOT COMPARABLE WITH, NOR SO AUTOMATIC AS THAT WHICH COULD RESULT FROM AN ATTACK ON NATO TERRITORY.

31. NATO HAS NOT THE RESOURCES TO COUNTER THIS THREAT BY DIRECT MEANS, THAT IS BY DEPLOYING EQUIVALENT MARITIME CAPABILITIES IN EVERY SEA AREA IN WHICH SOVIET SURFACE SHIPS, SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT MAY CHOOSE TO OPERATE, AND OF OFFERING COMPLETE PROTECTION TO ALL ALLIED SEA SUPPLY ROUTES BOTH WITHIN CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 01134 04 OF 05 031929Z

AND OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS TO ADOPT A DETERRENT POSTURE WHICH WILL CONVINCE AN AGGRESSOR, AS IN THE CASE OF LAND/AIR ATTACK ON NATO TERRITORY (PARAGRAPH 17 ABOVE) THAT HE WOULD BE INITIATING "A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH CANNOT BE CALCULATED IN ADVANCE AND WHICH INVOLVES RISKS TO THE AGRESSOR OUT OF PROPORTION TO ANY ADVANTAGES HE MIGHT HOPE TO GAIN".

32. FOR THIS PURPOSE NATO NEEDS TO MAINTAIN MARITIME FORCES WHICH ARE ABLE TO OFFER AN EFFECTIVE (THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY DECISIVE) RESPONSE TO ANY LEVEL OF AGGRESSION AT SEA, BUT WHICH MUST ABOVE ALL CARRY WITH IT THE RISK OF ESCALATION TO A HIGHER LEVEL - ON SEA, ON LAND OR IN THE AIR. NATO MUST, THEREFORE, MAINTAIN A MARITIME FORCE STRUCTURE WHICH WILL MAKE THE RISK OF ESCALATION BOTH CREDIBLE AND APPARENT. THERE MUST BE A CLOSE LINKAGE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND ALSO BETWEEN MARITIME AND OTHER NATO FORCES. THE PERCEIVED EFFECT OF THIS MARITIME FORCE POSTURE MUST BE COMPLEMENTED BY A DECLARATORY

POLICY INTENDED TO MAKE IT UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO THE OTHER SIDE THAT NATO ATTACHES SUCH VITAL IMPORTANCE TO ITS SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLY LINES THAT IT IS PREPARED TO USE ALL CAPABILITIES AT ITS DISPOSAL (INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS) IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THEIR SECURITY.

33. IN ALL CASES THE SOVIET PRECEPTION OF NATO'S CAPABILITIES IS BOUND TO INFLUENCE THEIR CALCULATIONS AS TO THE LIKELY SUCCESS OF THEIR ATTACK AND THEIR DECISIONS ON TACTICS AND TIMING.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCES

34. THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE ABILITY OF NATO FORCES TO DETER AND DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST THE KINDS OF AGGRESSION DESCRIBED ABOVE MAY BE SUMMARISED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE SIZE AND READINESS OF STANDING FORCES;

(B) THE ABILITY OF STANDING FORCES AND WEAPON SYSTEMS TO SURVIVE AND WITHSTAND INITIAL ASSAULT;

(C) THE SPEED WITH WHICH REINFORCEMENT AND MOBILISATION FORCES CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR IN THE BATTLE AREA;

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 01134 04 OF 05 031929Z

(D) THE ABILITY TO SUSTAIN A COHERENT DEFENCE, INCLUDING ADEQUACY OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT;

(E) THE FLEXIBILITY AND MOBILITY OF FORCES; AND THE ABILITY TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER.

35. THE PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTICS REQUIRED IN EACH TYPE OF FORCE ARE DISCUSSED FURTHER BELOW:

- STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES)
- THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES)
- LAND FORCES)
- SEA FORCES)
- AIR FORCES) TO FOLLOW
- R- ESERVE AND MOBILISATION FORCES)
- IMMEDIATE REACTION FORCES)
- LOGISTIC SUPPORT)

MBFR

36. WHILE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, CURRENT FORCE PLANNING IN NATO SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT BEFORE 1982 NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN EUROPE MAY BE REDUCED TO A COMMON CEILING OF THE ORDER OF 700,000 MEN, AND THAT THESE REDUCTIONS MIGHT BEGIN WITH WITHDRAWALS OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET TROOPS RESPECTIVELY.

ACCOUNT SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT. SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHARACTERISTICS, STRUCTURE, DEPLOYMENT AND EQUIPMENT, ETC. OF NATO FORCES. THESE SHOULD BE STUDIED BY THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH NATIONS SO THAT THE NECESSARY CHANGES CAN BE INTRODUCED INTO NATIONAL DEFENCE PROGRAMMES IN ANTICIPATION OF AN AGREEMENT.

RESOURCES

37. LEAVING ASIDE THE POSSIBILITIES OF MBFR, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT DURING THE CURRENT PLANNING PERIOD NATO'S PRESENT FORCE CAPABILITIES WILL HAVE TO BE MAINTAINED AT LEAST AT THEIR PRESENT LEVEL. THIS IMPLIES CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURE AND THE REGULAR REPLACEMENT AND MODERNISATION OF
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NATO 01134 04 OF 05 031929Z

MAJOR EQUIPMENT. THIS MUST BE THE BASIC PRINCIPLE WHICH DETERMINES THE ANNUAL AND LONG-TERM ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES IN ALL COUNTRIES.

38. IN RECENT YEARS THE MAIN PROBLEM OF DEFENCE RESOURCES PLANNING HAS BEEN THE PHENOMENON THAT OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES (MOSTLY DUE TO DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO PERSONNEL COSTS) HAVE RISEN SHARPLY, AND THAT INCREASES IN DEFENCE BUDGETS HAVE NOT KEPT PACE IN GENERAL WITH THE RATES OF INCREASE OF THESE COSTS. THIS HAS PUT AT RISK, AND IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES PROGRESSIVELY REDUCED, THE PROPORTION OF THE BUDGET AVAILABLE FOR CAPITAL INVESTMENT, RESULTING IN THE POSTPONEMENT, SLOWING DOWN OR EVEN CANCELLATION OF MUCH-NEEDED REPLACEMENT AND MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PRESENT FORCE STRUCTURES AND ALSO TO ALLOW FOR ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT MODERNISATION, APPROPRIATE PROVISION MUST IN FUTURE BE MADE IN DEFENCE BUDGETS TO COMPENSATE IN FULL FOR RATES OF INFLATION AND RUNNING COSTS, IN PARTICULAR PERSONNEL COSTS. IN ADDITION, THE SHARES IN DEFENCE BUDGETS DEVOTED TO MAJOR NEW EQUIPMENT NEED TO BE INCREASED IN ALL COUNTRIES WHERE THIS NOW FALLS BELOW 20 PCT (NATO DEFINITION).

39. THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED BY A MODEST ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL TERMS IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURES, COMPARABLE TO THE INCREASES OF 3 PCT TO 5 PCT PER YEAR ACHIEVED OVER THE LAST DECADE IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT. THE ACTUAL INCREASE REQUIRED WILL VARY FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, DEPENDING ON ITS EXISTING FORCE CAPABILITIES AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE, HOWEVER, THAT EACH COUNTRY SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE MAKING A CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON DEFENCE WHICH IS COMMENSURATE WITH ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH AND ITS POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. ONLY THUS CAN THEY HONOUR THE OBLIGATION ASSUMED IN THE OTTAWA DECLARATION TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY OF THEIR FORCES AND TO UNDERTAKE THEIR PROPER SHARE OF THE BURDEN OF MAINTAINING THE SECURITY OF ALL.

((40. THERE IS NOT SINGLE FORMULA FOR DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE SCALE OF DEFENCE EFFORT FOR EACH COUNTRY. NEVERTHELESS THERE ARE A NUMBER OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED CRITERIA FOR COMPARING THE DEMANDS MADE BY DEFENCE PROGRAMMES ON NATIONAL ECONOMIES. THE PERCENTAGE OF GNP DEVOTED TO DEFENCE IS ONE OF THE MORE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 NATO 01134 04 OF 05 031929Z

COMMONLY APPLICABLE INDICATIONS, BUT THIS DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH RATES, SIZE OF POPULATION, GEOGRAPHY OR CLIMATE. HOWEVER, PERCENTAGE OF GNP TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH A RANGE OF OTHER INDICATIONS, SUCH AS GNP AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA CAN PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF THE DEFENCE BURDEN ON EACH COUNTRY.)

41. IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES, NOTABLY THOSE WITH LOW NATIONAL INCOMES AND STILL IN THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION, NATIONAL RESOURCES ARE INADEQUATE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEFENCE. THESE COUNTRIES ARE TO A GREAT EXTENT, DEPENDENT ON AID FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR MAINTAINING THEIR FORCES AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE MODERNISATION OF EQUIPMENT. IN THESE COUNTRIES THE PROVISION OF AN ADEQUATE DEFENCE BECOMES A MATTER OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 01134 05 OF 05 031955Z

66

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-07 L-02

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

ACDA-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-10 SAM-01 NIC-01 ERDA-05

/079 W

----- 129858

P R 031555Z MAR 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 400
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVAVEUR
CINCUSAFE

ALL NATO CAPITALS 5077
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 5 OF 5 USNATO 1134

ECHNOLOGY

42. NATO COLLECTIVELY NEEDS TO MAINTAIN A TECHNOLOGICAL BASE SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION, SO THAT NECESSARY FORCE IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE MADE WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING OVERALL MILITARY BALANCES, ENSURE THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO FORCES, AND MINIMIZE THE CHANGES OF TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISES. ON ORDER TO MAINTAIN AN EFFICIENT AND INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL BASE, NATO SHOULD SEEK A MORE RATIONAL CO-ORDINATED DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TASKS, WHICH PERMITS ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION AND WASTE, PROMOTES STANDARDISATION, AND FACILITATES VIGOROUS FOLLOW-UP IN AREAS IN WHICH THE MILITARY PAY-OFF APPEARS SIGNIFICANT. THIS WILL REQUIRE INCREASED NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 01134 05 OF 05 031955Z

CO-OPERATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

43. NATO FORCES NEED TO BE SUITABLY MODERNISED TO MEET DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THREAT, BUT NOT ALL FORCES NEED THE SAME OR THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TASKS SHOULD BE ASSESSED AGAINST MISSION REQUIREMENTS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A BALANCED PROGRAMME IN WHICH PRIORITIES ARE SET. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN IN THE NEAR TERM TO DEVELOPING LESS SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF LOWER UNIT AND LIFE CYCLE COST, HIGH RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY, AND REQUIRING MINIMUM OPERATING PERSONNEL, WHICH CAN EVENTUALLY BE ACQUIRED IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO MAINTAIN OR IMPROVE OVERALL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST REALISTICALLY ASSESSED THREATS.

ALLIANCE CO-OPERATION

44. WITH THE RESOURCES AT ITS DISPOSAL, NATO SHOULD BE ABLE TO DEVOTE MORE TO DEFENCE THAN DOES THE WARSAW PACT. HOWEVER, NATO RESOURCES ARE NOT BEING EMPLOYED IN THE OPTIMUM MANNER SINCE DEFENCE PROGRAMMES ARE ORGANIZED FOR THE MOST PART ON A STRICTLY NATIONAL BASIS. THE EXISTENCE OF SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF FINANCE ARE BOUND TO PLACE SOME LIMITS ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH INTEGRATION OF COMMON PROGRAMMES CAN BE ACHIEVED; NEVERTHELESS THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY EXPLOITED AND WHERE A MORE ACTIVE APPROACH IS NOT REQUIRED. THESE LIE IN THE FIELD OF FLEXIBILITY, RATIONALISATION AND STANDARDISATION, AND APPLY BOTH TO THE OPERATIONAL ROLE OF FORCES AND TO THEIR SUPPORT.

45. IN THE OPERATIONAL FIELD NATO MUST MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE

USE OF ITS AVAILABLE FORCES. THE PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING FLEXIBILITY OF ACE(1) SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A STARTING POINT; IN THIS LIGHT THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD NOW REVIEW THEIR OPERATIONAL AND REINFORCEMENT PLANS WITH THE AIM OF ELIMINATING EXISTING CONSTRAINTS, WHETHER POLITICAL, DOCTRINAL, TECHNICAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL. TO THIS END COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS, LOGISTICS, TACTICAL MOBILITY AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS SHOULD BE REVIEWED. ATTENTION SHOULD INITIALLY BE GIVEN TO THE CENTRAL REGION AND TO MARITIME FLEXIBILITY. OTHER REGIONAL REVIEWS SHOULD FOLLOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 01134 05 OF 05 031955Z

46. RATIONALISATION INVOLVES THE ELIMINATION OF REDUNDANT PROGRAMMES, THE CONSOLIDATION OF SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ADJUSTMENT OF MISSIONS AND FORCE MIXES OF NATIONAL COMPONENTS. SAVINGS THUS PRODUCED SHOULD BE REINVESTED IN HIGH PRIORITY FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES, AND COMMON-FUNDED PROGRAMMES. SUCH REALLOCATIONS CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT COMPLETELY WITHIN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, BUT ONLY ACROSS A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHOSE FORCES INTERACT IN A GIVEN AREA. ATTENTION SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON AREAS WHICH HOLD THE MOST POTENTIAL FOR EARLY PROGRESS INCLUDING CONSOLIDATION OF COMMUNICATIONS, HOST NATION SUPPORT OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AND COMMON TRAINING. RATIONALISATION SHOULD NOT RESULT IN ANY DIMINUTION OF THE OVERALL FORCE CAPABILITIES OF THE ALLIANCE NOR IN THE TOTAL DEFENCE EFFORTS OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES.

47. IN THE FIELD OF STANDARDISATION A LIMITED NUMBER OF PROJECTS SHOULD BE BROUGHT FORWARD FOR MINISTERIAL ATTENTION WITH THE OBJECT OF RESOLVING OUTSTANDING POLICY ISSUES AND ACHIEVING THE REQUIRED DECISIONS. THE PROJECTS SELECTED SHOULD BE THOSE CONSIDERED MOST LIKELY TO IMPROVE NATO'S OVERALL DEFENCE CAPABILITIES, AND TO ACHIEVE A SUBSTANTIALLY BETTER APPLICATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES.

(1) SACEUR'S REPORT FOR THE MINISTERIAL MEETING

48. CO-OPERATIVE PROJECTS IN THE FIELD OF ARMAMENTS PRODUCTION, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND LOGISTICS REMAIN A PRINCIPAL METHOD OF MAKING BETTER USE OF RESOURCES. WHILST EACH NATION BEARS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR EFFECTING IMPROVEMENTS IN THE EQUIPMENTS WHICH IT MUST PROVIDE FOR ITS FORCES, IN MANY CASES THIS CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED THROUGH MULTILATERAL OR BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS. IT MUST BE AN ESTABLISHED AND CLEAR OBJECTIVE FOR EACH NATO NATION TO MAKE THE BEST USE OF SUCH ARRANGEMENTS.

49. A RATIONAL ALLIANCE DEFENCE STRUCTURE ALSO REQUIRES A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN THE SUPPORT OF NATIONAL FORCES AND COMMONLY FUNDED ACTIVITIES, AND SPECIFICALLY THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME. HERE A FRESH REVIEW IS REQUIRED OF THE NEED FOR, AND SCOPE OF, PROJECTS IN PREVIOUSLY APPROVED CATEGORIES AND

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NATO 01134 05 OF 05 031955Z

PROGRAMMES. A PROPORTION OF ANY ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES BECOMING AVAILABLE SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO EXPANDING OR MAINTAINING SUCH PROGRAMMES.

SUPPORT FOR THE CIVIL SECTOR

50. THE DETERRENT AND DEFENCE POLICIES OF THE ALLIANCE DEPEND NOT ONLY ON A MILITARY CAPABILITY TO RESIST AGGRESSION BUT EQUALLY ON THE EVIDENT READINESS OF EACH MEMBER COUNTRY TO ENGAGE ITS POPULATION AND ITS WHOLE CIVIL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF THOSE POLICIES. MOREOVER, IN THE LIGHT OF THE INCREASING PRESSURE ON THE SIZE OF MILITARY FORCES, THE CIVIL SECTOR MUST BE FURTHER EXPLOITED TO PROVIDE SUPPORTING SERVICES AND RESOURCES SO AS TO PRESERVE COMBAT STRENGTHS. THERE IS THEN A NEED BOTH AT NATIONAL AND NATO LEVEL TO MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR THE MOBILISATION OF CIVILIAN RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF ALLIANCE DEFENCE WHICH CORRESPOND WITH THOSE IN THE MILITARY SECTOR.

51. CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING IN NATO SHOULD BE ORGANIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STRATEGIC AND OTHER PRINCIPLES DESCRIBED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ENSURING THAT THE CIVIL SECTOR CAN MOVE RAPIDLY INTO ACTION, WHEN REQUIRED, TO PROVIDE A SOLID AND DETERMINED HOME FRONT WHICH CAN:

(A) TRANSLATE THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL ECONOMIES TO A WAR FOOTING;

(B) SUSTAIN THE WILL AND ABILITY OF THE PEOPLE TO MEET AND SURVIVE THE THREAT; AND

(C) PROVIDE IMMEDIATE AND CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY SECTOR.

52. NO SIGNIFICANT COST IS INVOLVED. WHAT IS NEEDED IS PLANNING EFFORT AND CO-ORDINATION ON A NATO AND NATIONAL BASIS. SUCH PLANNING AND CO-OPERATION MUST BE DIRECTLY LINKED TO PLANNING IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

PRIORITIES

53. IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE BEST MILITARY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 NATO 01134 05 OF 05 031955Z

VALUE FROM THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE WITHOUT A REALLY VIGOROUS INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF PRIORITIES.

54. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON A ROUGH PARITY OF FORCES AT THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LEVEL; THESE NEED TO BE

MODERNISED BUT NOT EXPANDED. THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES WILL
RETAIN THEIR RELATIVE IMPORTANCE IN THE NATO TRIAD AND (MAY)
(WILL) REQUIRE MODERNISATION. IT IS, HOWEVER, IN THE
CONVENTIONAL FIELD THAT THERE IS MOST DANGER OF THE WARSAW PACT
GAINING AN ADVANTAGE OVER THE FORCES OF NATO: THIS IS,
THEREFORE, THE ELEMENT OF NATO'S DETERRENT AND DEFENCES WHICH
MOST NEEDS STRENGTHENING.

55. AT LEAST FOR THE PERIOD UP TO 1982, AVAILABLE
RESOURCES SHOULD BE CHANNELLED PRINCIPALLY IN SUPPORT OF:

(A) CAPABILITIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO DETERRENCE;

(B) CAPABILITIES WHICH CAN BE DEPLOYED EFFECTIVELY WITHIN
THE WARNING TIME AVAILABLE OR WHICH CAN AFFECT THE FIRST
FEW DAYS OF HOSTILITIES;

(C) MEASURES WHICH IMPROVE THE QUALITY AND READINESS OF
THESE FORCES, AND PROLONG THEIR CAPABILITY TO
SUSTAIN A SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE.

THESE SHOULD BE PURSUED IF NECESSARY AT THE EXPENSE OF MEASURES
WHICH DO NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ABOVE.

MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

56. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, MINISTERS HAVE LAID DOWN
THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES FOR NATO DEFENCE PLANNING FOR THE
PERIOD UP TO 1982 AND BEYOND, IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:
TO BE COMPLETED LATER.
END TEXT
BRUCE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 MAR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GarlanWA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO01134
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750398/abbrzimy.tel
Line Count: 953
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 18
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. USNATO 0575 B. USNATO 0701 C. USNATO 0901 D. USNATO 0950 E. USNATO 1058 F. USNATO 1092
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02 APR 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <18 AUG 2003 by GarlanWA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE
TAGS: MPOL, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVAVEUR
CINCUSAFE
ALL NATO CAPITALS
MBFR VIENNA

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006